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ORIGINS OF A NATIONAL LABOR
POLICY*
In the forty years since passage of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act (NLRA),1 the American labor movement has confronted
and precipitated dramatic legal and political change. Senator
Wagner described the Act,that would bear his name as the charter
of democracy's economic creed.2 It would grant "'to our industrial
workers the same general idea of freedom which the founding
fathers conferred upon citizens of the United States."3 Subsequent
legislation has refined and perhaps narrowed the original formula-
tion. Nevertheless, the NLRA began a process that has in-
stitutionalized labor unions in the United States. Recognized as a
legitimate force in our society, organized labor enjoys oa broad
influence over American life.
The Great Depression focused national concern on the long-
standing grievances of America's working people. In passing the
NLRA, Congress proclaimed "a new Magna Carta for employees."' 4
Its goal was to stop "starvation wages and long, inhuman houTrs ,of
work,"' 5 along with other forms of "exploitation by selfish, greedy
employers. ' 6 To many congressmen, the abuses of American in-
dustrialism were manifest. Representative Lesinski argued that
assembly line techniques had transformed men into the slaves of
machines and that job security was often unknown. 7 Senator
* This introduction was written by Carl L. Bucki, an Article Editor of the Cornell Law
Review.
, Act of July 5, 1935, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449, as amended, 29 U.S.C. *§§ 1,51-68 X1970),
§ 169 (Supp. IV, 1974) (also known as Wagner Act).
2 Radio address by Senator Wagner, reproduced in 80 CoNG. REc. 3301 (1936). See aiso
79 CoNe. REc. 2372 <1935) (remarks of Senator Wagner).
3 79 CoNG. REc. 9710 (1935) (remarks of Representative Mead).
' Id. at 9716 (remarks of Representative Truax).
I d. at 9684 (remarks of Representative Connery).
6 Id. at 9716 (rcmarks of Representative Truax).
7 Id. at 9736. The Congressman noted instances where the auto industry -paid men for
40 hours but made them work as high as 72 hours and forced the employees to sign weekly
33-9
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Wagner saw labor reform leading to higher wages, a subsequent
increase in consumer demand, and thus ultimately to an end to the
depression.8 Nor was the NLRA's appeal solely economic.
We are trying to give to the men and women of the United
States the right to be free American citizens, to go about and say,
"I am master of my soul, I am not an industrial slave.... I am
free to organize to get decent living wages to take care of my wife
and my children."9
To achieve its economic and social objectives, the Wagner Act
placed primary reliance on the collective bargaining process. The
statute's theory was to recognize exclusive representation whenever
a union received majority support.' 0 As the bargaining agent for all
employees, the union could exert their concerted voice in forcing
concessions from management. Collective bargaining has sub-
sequently proven its popularity among American labor. Union
membership doubled within five years of the NLRA's enactment,
and by 1972, it had increased almost six fold." Skeptics may assert
that higher wages and improved working conditions were inevita-
ble. Nevertheless, the past four decades have witnessed among
unionized workers a lessening of the human tragedies that moti-
vated passage of the Wagner Act.' 2
The National Labor Relations Act instituted a limited and
slips to the effect that they only worked 40 hours." Id. Since younger men were better able to
withstand this taxing labor, employers frequently discharged those workers over 40 years of
age.
s See id. at 7568 (remarks of Senator Wagner).
Id. at 9685 (remarks of Representative Connery).
10 Id. at 7571 (remarks of Senator Wagner). See id. at 9727 (remarks of Representative
Ramspeck); National Labor Relations Act § 9(a), ch. 372, § 9(a), 49 Stat. 449 (1935), as
amended, 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1970).
11 BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, DEP'T OF COMMERCE, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED
STATES 98 (1960); BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 1974 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT
OF THE UNITED STATES 365 (1974). Although the percentage of union members in the
labor force has declined from its peak in 1953, U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, DEP'T OF
LABOR, HANDBOOK OF LABOR STATISTICS 333 (1972), this phenomenon possibly reflects the
changing nature of the labor force. Cf. 1974 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra, at 350.
12 Significant wage increases indicate improved employment conditions among union-
ized workers. Based on a scale where the average hourly wage in 1967 equaled 100, the
following table compares the real value of hourly earnings among selected unionized
workers in 1935 and 1971.
1935 1971
Building Trades 21.8 144.0
Printing 26.5 133.6
Local Transit 22.2 135.8
U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, DEP'T OF LABOR, HANDBOOK OF LABOR STATISTICS 197-98
(1972).
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narrowly defined program. Its sponsor in the House indicated that
the Act's sole aim was "to guarantee to labor . . . the power to
bargain collectively through representatives of their own choos-
ing."'13 The Seventy-fourth Congress consequently confined its
concern to the implementation of this proposal. Recalling the
recent death of the National Industrial Recovery Act (NRA), 14
congressmen seemed most troubled by constitutional limitations.
Although the Supreme Court ultimately approved the Wagner
Act, 15 proponents structured their arguments and possibly the
statute to satisfy constitutional objections.' 6 The other topics of
congressional debate primarily centered on the mechanism that
would most effectively fulfill the legislation's purpose. Congress
wanted to extend democracy to the work place. Senator Wagner
argued that
democracy in industry must be based upon the same principles
as democracy in government. Majority rule, with all its imperfec-
tions, is the best protection of workers' rights, just as it is the
surest guaranty of political liberty that mankind has yet discov-
ered.17
The creation of a National Labor Relations Board provided
the basic device to implement national labor policy. Designed to
foster "harmony and mutual concessions,"' 8 this forum would
ground its success on the "equal confidence" that both labor and
industry would place in its impartiality."9 Congress therefore de-
sired that the Board be independent, 20 "free from any influence in
the executive department," 2' and nonpartisan. 22
A limited measure with limited purposes,23 the NLRA avoided
peripheral considerations. Congressional debates never explored
such deep issues of later times as civil rights. Indeed, several
13 79 CONG. REc. 9683-84 (1935) (remarks of Representative Connery). See also id. at
7660 (remarks of Senator Walsh).
'4 The National Industrial Recovery Act, ch. 90, 48 Stat. 195 (1933), was ruled
unconstitutional in Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). Referring
to the symbol of the NRA, Representative Truax noted: "[N]ow the Blue Eagle has been
transformed, by the Supreme Court decision, into a blue buzzard, and as General Johnson
has so aptly said, 'is as dead as the dodo' which is extinct." 79 CONG. REC. 9715 (1935).
15 NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
16 See 79 CONG. REc. 7571-72 (1935) (remarks of Senator Wagner).
17 Id. at 7571 (remarks of Senator Wagner).
18 Radio address by Senator Wagner, reproduced in 80 CONG. REC. 3300 (1936).
19 79 CONG. REC. 9723 (1935) (remarks of Representative Marcantonio).
20 Id. at 9725 (remarks of Representative O'Malley).
21 Id. at 9722 (remarks of Representative Ramspeck) (by implication).
22 Cf id. at 7569 (remarks of Senator Wagner).
23 See id. at 7659-60 (remarks of Senator Walsh); note 13 and accompanying textsupra.
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statements were inconsistent with philosophies of more recent and
radical vintage. Senator Walsh argued that "[n]o one can compel an
employer to hire others in addition to those he sees fit to hire. '24
Another supporter of the Act charged that its opponents had also
fought protective legislation for women.25
This symposium commemorates a labor statute that initiated
four decades of exciting legal development. Our selection of arti-
cles reflects that process of change from the standards of 1936.
Discussing the impact of civil rights legislation, Professor Smith's
Article and the Note on Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody26 illustrate a
fundamental expansion of legal objectives. Both pieces examine
recent efforts by the Supreme Court to define the remedies avail-
able for a Tite VII violation. To what extent has the Court limited
backpay litigation and self-help? The assessment of these questions
suggests a possible conflict between the goal of equal opportunity
and the original purposes of the NLRA.
Even when competing policies are absent, a statutory formula-
tion may fail to implement legislative intent. Congress desired to
infuse democracy into the work place, but Professor Brooks argues
that unions have become autocratic and unrepresentative. Because
labor legislation has failed to guarantee employees a freedom of
choice, Professor Brooks fears that current practices will induce
self-destruction for many unions. The situation described by Mr.
Vladeck contrasts sharply with congressional hopes that the NLRB
would remain independent and nonpartisan. He argues that the
men President Nixon appointed to the Board transformed it into
an essentially anti-union institution, one that reversed important
precedents favorable to the labor movement.
Legislation rarely anticipates every possible controversy that
might arise over a statute's interpretation. Student analyses of
Muniz v. Hoffman 27 and Connell Construction Co. v. Plumbers Local
10028 examine judicial efforts to resolve such uncertainty in the
areas of jury rights and antitrust liability. In Muniz, the Supreme
Court held that the procedural limitations of Norris-La Guardia
did not apply to the Wagner Act and other subsequent labor
legislation. Since no constitutional rights were infringed, the stat-
utes could deny a jury trial for contempt proceedings. The Note's
24 79 CONG. REC. 7673 (remarks of Senator Walsh).
25 Id. at 9677 (remarks of Representative O'Connor).
26 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
27 422 U.S. 454 (1975).
28 421 U.S. 616 (1975).
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author predicts that the availability of a broad power of summary
contempt will build tension between labor and the judiciary. In
recognizing a union's potential liability under the Sherman Act,
Connell renewed the longstanding controversy over labor's immu-
nity from the antitrust laws. Questioning the majority's approach,
the writer advises that only legislation should draw this arbitrary
line between two divergent but legitimate views of congressional
intent.
Forty years hindsight provides a perspective to assess the
direction that labor law should pursue. Perhaps America must
reassert the basic values that the NLRA attempted to implement. Is
the current regime becoming obsolete for a society of increasing
technical and social complexity? If the collective bargaining process
has induced a desired redistribution of wealth, perhaps its applica-
tion should expand to previously unprotected groups. The resolu-
tion of competing policies may require fine distinctions not clearly
apparent from statutory and judicial precedents. Social orientations
may influence difficult decisions over goals and methods. When
employees first battle for a decent living wage, unionization carries
a liberal reputation. Once workers secure a comfortable economic
position, however, efforts to maintain that status acquire a more
conservative image. In both situations, our labor policies must
establish through law an equitable process of wealth distribution.
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